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I. INTRODUCTION
Every morning thousands of residents arise and bring in the
morning newspaper to check the most important news of the day:
last night's score of the home team's major league baseball game.
Baseball's prominent part in American life should not obscure the
fact that baseball is big business. The economic impact of a major
league baseball team affects the players, owners, and fans directly
involved in the game. This impact also significantly affects the
commercial life of the cities in which they play.'
* Marietta College (B.A., 1977), University of Michigan (J.D., 1980), St. Thomas Uni-
versity (M.S., 1987). Administrative Assistant, University of Evansville Department of
Athletics.
1. The Milwaukee Braves, a National League franchise, reported that from 1953 to
1965 the team brought the city of Milwaukee over $77.5 million in income that the city
would not have otherwise realized. Robert Nathan, an economist, concluded that the team's
estimate was too modest. The team's presence was actually worth $18 million a year to the
city of Milwaukee. L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW 508 (1977); see also N.Y.
Times, Mar. 8, 1966, at 34, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1957, at 30, col. 3 (stating that the
Mayor of San Francisco estimated that the franchise coming to the city would bring $25-40
million into the city's economy); N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1966, § 3, at 11, col. 7 (noting that the
1
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There are now 26 major league baseball teams housed in 24
cities. Fourteen are in the American League and twelve are in the
National League.2 Metropolitan areas often compete for an oppor-
tunity to house a major league baseball team.3 Professional base-
ball can bring a city unique entertainment, an increased sense of
civic pride, and publicity and prestige that expand commercial ac-
tivity and tourism.4
A city has essentially two approaches for obtaining a major
league baseball franchise: expansion or franchise relocation. This
article focuses on franchise relocation. The article will first ex-
amine the major league's requirements for relocating a franchise.
Second, the article will review each of the relocation requests for-
mally acted upon by baseball club owners and the considerations
that went into each one of those decisions. Third, the article will
determine the impact of the Congress and judiciary on baseball
franchise relocation, recently discussed in Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Commission v. National Football League.' Finally, the
article will set forth a recommended course of action for major
league baseball in its franchise relocation decisions.
II. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL RULES
Each owner in major league baseball holds a franchise that en-
titles the owner to operate a team in a geographical region desig-
nated by agreement of the member clubs. Any request to move a
franchise must be voted upon by the other team owners.
Prior to 1952 the rules of organized baseball required that a
franchise move have the unanimous approval of all owners in the
league to which the team belonged, and majority consent by the
owners in the other league. After 1952, the rules were relaxed to
arrival of major league baseball in Atlanta directly resulted in over $9 million in revenues,
and indirectly generated an additional $30 million for people in the city).
2. American League teams currently include the Baltimore Orioles, Boston Red Sox,
California Angels, Chicago White Sox, Cleveland Indians, Detroit Tigers, Kansas City
Royals, Milwaukee Brewers, Minnesota Twins, New York Yankees, Oakland Athletics, Seat-
tle Mariners, Texas Rangers, and Toronto Blue Jays. National League teams currently in-
clude the Atlanta Braves, Chicago Cubs, Cincinnati Reds, Houston Astros, Los Angeles
Dodgers, Montreal Expos, New York Mets, Philadelphia Phillies, Pittsburgh Pirates, St.
Louis Cardinals, San Diego Padres, and San Francisco Giants. The only metropolitan areas
housing two franchises are Los Angeles and New York, although San Francisco and Oakland
are often considered one metropolitan area (the Bay Area).
3. See Sullivan, Jersey Makes Pitch for Team, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1985, at 49, col. 6
(12 metropolitan areas made proposals for expansion franchises to a committee of major
league owners).
4. Note, Can We Save Our Ball Club? 2 COMM./ENT. L.J. 97, 97 (1979).
5. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
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require a three-fourths majority in the moving club's league.'
These rules remained essentially the same until 1983 when the
requirement of majority consent from the other league was rein-
stated. The current rules, therefore, require an affirmative vote by
three-fourths of the clubs in the league affected plus a majority
vote in the other league to approve movement of a franchise.'
There are two exceptions to this rule. First, three-fourths of the
clubs in the unaffected league must give their consent when a club
wishes to move into a city with a population less than 2.4 million
in which the unaffected league has a club.8 Second, if a club pro-
poses a move to an area near an existing team, that team has veto
rights over the move.'
There are no specific criteria for approval or disapproval of
franchise relocation requests. When a team applies for relocation
of its franchise, the president of the affected league requests all
information relevant to the proposed relocation and the effect and
consequences of the relocation upon members of the league. The
league president then evaluates this information and makes a rec-
ommendation to the members of the league. 10
The Commissioner of Major League Baseball also is involved
6. Quirk, An Economic Analysis of Team Movements in Professional Sports, 38 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 42, 49 (1973). In 1956, the National League changed the rule back to
requiring an unanimous vote. McGowen, Dodgers Buy Los Angeles Club, Stirring Talk of
Shift to Coast, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1957, at 1, col. 2. In 1958, before final approval of the
moves of the Brooklyn Dodgers and the New York Giants, the league amended the rule back
to a three-fourths vote. Perlmutter, 2-Week Delay Given To Dodgers Move, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 2, 1958, at 1, col. 8.
7. Major League Agreement, art. V, sec. 2 (b)(3), as provided in 1987 BASEBALL BLUE
BOOK 507 (1987). See Hearings on Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985
Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 58-9 (1985) (statement of Edwin Durso, General Counsel, Major League Baseball)
[hereinafter Hearings].
8. Major League Rules I(c)(1), as provided in 1987 BLUE BOOK, supra note 7, at 511-
12. There are several other requirements to be complied with in this situation, see note 9,
infra, but the population requirement is the primary one. The rules also do not allow any
city to have more than two major league clubs.
9. National League Const. & Rules art. 3.2 (1962) (within 10 miles) and American
League Const. & Rules art. 3.2 (1966) (within 100 miles), cited in Note, The Super Bowl
and The Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARV. L.
REv. 418, 429 (1967); Major League Rules I(c)(I)(iii) (club of one league cannot move within
five miles of the stadium of a club in the other league unless that club agrees), as provided
in 1987 BLUE BOOK, supra note 7, at 511. See also Hearings, supra note 7, at 59 (statement
of Durso).
10. Hearings, supra note 7, at 56 (statement of Peter Ueberroth, Commissioner, Major
League Baseball). According to Ueberroth, the recommendation of the league president and
the league's decision are based on such considerations as the support and commitment the
home community has given to its franchise, the existing stadium lease, and the effect a move
may have on the structure and divisional alignment of the league. Id.
19871
3
Eisen: Franchise Relocation in Major League Baseball
Published by Institutional Repository, 1987
22 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
in this process. The Commissioner is empowered to investigate, ei-
ther upon complaint or his own initiative, any act which is charged
or suspected to be not in the best interests of baseball.1 This
power has been interpreted to extend to the aspects of a proposed
relocation that may affect baseball.'"
The owners regard their teams as a "single entity" and thus
require these rules on franchise relocation. The teams jointly pro-
duce a product which no one team can produce alone. According to
the single entity theory, the financial success or failure of each
franchise affects the fortunes of the other teams in the league. This
impact is felt directly through the revenue sharing of national tele-
vision contracts and gate receipts, and indirectly through public
confidence.13 The success of the venture, therefore, depends upon
each team being financially stable. 4 Franchising decisions signifi-
cantly affect a club's financial return and that of the league in gen-
eral. Rules governing franchise relocation have thus been devel-
oped to protect the financial stability and integrity of the leagues. 5
There are four specific reasons for the restraints on franchise
relocation. First, the restraints work toward competitive schedul-
ing. Every team has an interest in where its games are played. Ter-
ritorial restraints promote general agreement on where teams play.
Teams must have definite home sites. Further, they want to make
travel between games as easy and economical as possible. Unre-
strained movement could result in unmanageable travel condi-
tions. 16 For example, in 1953, Clark Griffith, owner and president
of the Washington Senators, opposed a move of the St. Louis team
to Kansas City. At the time St. Louis was the westernmost city in
the American League. Griffith complained that Kansas City was
11. Major League Agreement, Art. I, sec. 2, as provided in 1987 BLUE BOOK, supra
note 7, at 501. See Hearings, supra note 7, at 56 (statement of Ueberroth).
12. Id. See infra notes 174, 184, and accompanying text.
13. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 799 (1979). Receipts from national
television contracts are shared equally among major league baseball clubs even though some
clubs make a disproportionate contribution to the production of televised events. Each club
keeps its local television revenues, but gate receipts are split 85 percent for the home team
and 15 percent for the visiting team. The purpose of these rules is to offset part of the
disadvantage which some clubs have by being in more marginal markets. Id.
14. Kempf, The Misapplication of Antitrust Law to Professional Sports Leagues, 32
DE PAUL L. REV. 625, 629 (1983).
15. See id. at 626-32; Kurlantzick, Thoughts on Professional Sports and the Antitrust
Laws: Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 15 CONN.
L. REV. 183, 196-99 (1983); Glick, Professional Sports Franchise Movements and the Sher-
man Act: When and Where Teams Should Be Able to Move, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55,
80-86 (1983).
16. Glick, supra note 15, at 80.
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"not in our circuit geographically" and would therefore increase
travel difficulties.'1
The second reason for restraints on franchise relocation is es-
tablishing league legitimacy. Certain markets, such as New York
and Chicago, are necessary for league credibility, and restraints on
movement can ensure league stability by keeping teams in such
markets. Even though a league is already "established," interest in
team stability is still great for, as stated, the economic success of
each team depends on the strength and stability of other teams.
Every team that moves and fails decreases overall competition and
hurts the league's image of stability.'
The third reason for franchise relocation restraints is commu-
nity support and public service. If teams moved too often, cities
would be less likely to invest in the league, making it difficult for
the league to place teams in certain markets.' 9 Further, it is com-
mon practice for public agencies to finance construction of stadi-
ums. Unrestrained team movement could leave the taxpayers sup-
porting a limited-use facility that may be incapable of generating
other revenues. If a team could move anytime it wished, fans
would probably be less enthusiastic in their support of the team.
Unrestricted team movement would damage the league's goodwill
and threaten the development of fan loyalty and traditional rival-
ries.' ° By limiting transfers, professional baseball avoids ill will, re-
sentment and potential lawsuits."
The last reason for restrained movement of baseball franchises
is profitability. Clubs must be in a market area which has the capa-
bility of supporting a franchise." By providing each club with ter-
ritorial exclusivity, the league is able to avoid destructive in-
traleague economic competition. This protection is considered
necessary to encourage financial investments in franchise opera-
tions.2 3 The strategic placement of franchises can also generate the
nationwide interest critical to obtaining network television con-
tracts, a major source of baseball's revenue. Geographic and com-
petitive balance is necessary to attract and keep the public watch-
ing professional baseball games on television in major media
17. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1953, at 29, col. 3.
18. Glick, supra note 15, at 81-82.
19. Glick, supra note 15, at 82-84.
20. Kurlantzick, supra note 15, at 196.
21. Kurlantzick, supra note 15, at 196; J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, BASEBALL ECONOM-
ICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 106 (1981).
22. J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 21, at 90.
23. Kurlantzick, supra note 15, at 197; Glick, supra note 15, at 85-86.
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III. FRANCHISE RELOCATIONS
From 1903 to 1953 there were no franchise expansions or
moves in professional baseball. The same sixteen teams in the
same sixteen locations comprised the two major leagues.25 Since
1953, however, the major leagues have expanded by ten teams26
and ten franchises have relocated.27 League franchise owners voted
down only two proposed moves. The proposal to move the St.
Louis Browns to Baltimore for the 1953 season and later for the
1954 season failed, as did a proposal to move the Kansas City Ath-
letics to Louisville for the 1964 season.
A. Boston Braves to Milwaukee (NL), 1953
Little more than one month before the start of the 1953 sea-
son, the National League owners unanimously approved the Bos-
24. Kurlantzick, supra note 15, at 199; Glick, supra note 15, at 86.
25. American League teams included the Boston Red Sox, Chicago White Sox, Cleve-
land Indians, Detroit Tigers, New York Yankees, Philadelphia Athletics, St. Louis Browns,
and Washington Senators. National League teams included the Boston Braves, Brooklyn
Dodgers, Chicago Cubs, Cincinnati Reds, New York Giants, Philadelphia Phillies, Pitts-
burgh Pirates, and St. Louis Cardinals. Five metropolitan areas had two or more teams.
New York had three, and Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, and St. Louis each had two.
26. American League expansion franchises include the Washington Senators (1961),
California Angels (1961), Seattle Pilots (1969), Kansas City Royals (1969), Seattle Mariners
(1977), and Toronto Blue Jays (1977). National League expansion franchises include the
New York Mets (1962), Houston Astros (1962), Montreal Expos (1969), and San Diego Pa-
dres (1969).
27. The 10 franchise relocations are as follows:
Team League Year Vote
1) Boston Braves to Milwaukee NL 1953 unanimous
2) St. Louis Browns to Baltimore AL 1954 unanimous
3) Philadelphia Athletics to Kansas City AL 1955 6-2
4) Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles NL 1958 unanimous
5) New York Giants to San Francisco NL 1958 unanimous
6) Washington Senators to Minnesota AL 1961 6-2
7) Milwaukee Braves to Atlanta NL 1966 unanimous
8) Kansas City Athletics to Oakland AL 1968 7-3
9) Seattle Pilots to Milwaukee AL 1970 unanimous
10) Washington Senators to Texas AL 1972 10-2
In 1966, the Los Angeles Angels moved from Los Angeles to Anaheim, 25 miles south,
and became the California Angels. This was only a move to a different stadium in the same
metropolitan area. The author will not consider this a franchise move. See N.Y. Times, Aug.
9, 1964, § 5, at 2, col. 6. In 1973, the National League club owners conditionally approved
the sale and relocation of the San Diego Padres to Washington. This arrangement fell
through when the new ownership failed to arrange for indemnity of the league in the event
of any lawsuits resulting from the move. See L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 513-33.
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ton Braves' move to Milwaukee.2 8 From 1946 to 1950 the Braves'
attendance averaged over one million. Attendance decreased below
500,000 in 1951. By 1952 it plummeted to 281,000, resulting in a
total loss of over $700,000 in 1951 and 1952.29 Lou Perini, owner of
the Braves, explained that, "since the advent of television Boston
has become a one-team city and the enthusiasm for the Boston
National League club has waned [while the enthusiasm for the
Boston American League club has continued]. The interests of
baseball can be best served elsewhere and Milwaukee has shown
tremendous enthusiasm."' The Braves' owner undoubtedly re-
garded Milwaukee's offer to set rent for its new five million dollar
stadium at $1,000 a year for the first two years, and then at five
percent of the gross receipts for the next three years, as part of
this "enthusiasm. 1
After the National League owners approved the Braves' move
to Milwaukee, league president Warren Giles concluded that "the
fine standing and prestige of Perini in our league was a great fac-
tor" leading to league approval.32 Giles also indicated that the
owners were concerned about the effect the move would have on
scheduling and team commitments, but releases were eventually
obtained from local radio and television contracts. Although the
timing was inconvenient, the National League owners decided that
it was prudent to establish a major league baseball team in a thriv-
ing Midwestern city. 3
B. St. Louis Browns to Baltimore (AL), 1954
The National League's approval of the move to Milwaukee
was surprising because it came within days of the American
League's rejection of the St. Louis Browns' request to move to Bal-
timore. St. Louis, like Boston, was a two-team city, housing the
Browns and the National League's Cardinals. The Browns lost
$400,000 in 1952. Its president, Bill Veeck, complained that St.
Louis could not support two teams even if both were pennant win-
ners. Veeck felt that the Browns' financial problems were due to
the Cardinals' televised away games. Only a move out of St. Louis
28. Effrat, Braves Move to Milwaukee; Majors' First Shift Since '03, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 19, 1953, at 1, col. 2.
29. Id.; Quirk, supra note 6, at 52-53.
30. Effrat, supra note 28.
31. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1953, at 42, col. 1.
32. Effrat, supra note 28.
33. Effrat, supra note 28. The metropolitan area of Milwaukee had a population of
871,000. One and a half million people resided within a 100 mile radius of the city. Id.
1987]
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could save the Browns. 4
The Browns originally wanted to move to Milwaukee, but the
Milwaukee franchise of the American Association, which was
owned by Lou Perini, effectively blocked that effort. 5 The Browns
then turned their attention to Baltimore. The Maryland city of-
fered a 10-year lease with a 10-year option on a modern 39,500 seat
stadium. A second tier would be added to the stadium increasing
the total capacity to 62,000.38
Approval of this move appeared to be a virtual certainty.3 7
The owners, however, voted 5-2 against the move. As a result, the
American League president, Will Harridge, issued this statement:
The league decided that the numerous problems involved pre-
cluded a transfer of the franchise by reason of the short period
of time before the opening of the 1953 season. In view of the
improved attendance of the Browns [from 289,000 in 1951 to
518,000] in 1952 and the urgent requests from the numerous St.
Louis fans for retention of the club in St. Louis, the league looks
forward to increased support of the St. Louis fans.3
Harridge further explained that there were complications involving
television commitments, schedules, ticket sales, the possibility of
lawsuits, and general uncertainty of leaving a city in which the
league had been for 50 years. 9
A noted sports columnist of the time, Arthur Daley, offered
his own interpretation of why the American League team owners
refused the Browns' request. "Personality had much to do with it
because Wild William [Veeck] and his unpredictable way of both
operating and popping off haven't endeared him to his fellow-own-
ers." 40 Veeck apparently antagonized other club owners by his ir-
reverent approach to baseball and his demand for sharing televi-
sion revenues. 4 ' Daley also identified the idea of a last minute
34. Effrat, Transfer of Browns to Baltimore Rejected by American League Club Own-
ers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1953, at 32, col. 1.
35. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1953, at 32, col. 5. Perini also owned the then Boston Braves.
He wanted Milwaukee to be an escape hatch for his Boston club. Perini relocated the
Braves to preempt Veeck. Daley, Discordant Notes From Musical Owners, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 24, 1971, at 49, col. 1.
36. Effrat, supra note 34.
37. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1953, at 20, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1953, § 5, at 1,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1953, at 24, col. 1.
38. Effrat, supra note 34.
39. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1953, at 32, col. 2.
40. Daley, The Reluctant Tenant, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1953, at 33, col. 2.
41. See Quirk, supra note 6, at 50; Note, supra note 9, at 429 n.59.
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change as a factor in the decision."2
After drawing only 311,000 fans in 1953, Veeck again re-
quested approval of a shift to Baltimore.43 This time the American
League team owners rejected the request by a 4-4 vote. The rea-
sons given for the rejection were Baltimore's close proximity to two
struggling franchises, Philadelphia and Washington, and the in-
triguing aspects of the Los Angeles market."
Two days after the rejection vote, Veeck sold his controlling
interest in the Browns to a Baltimore syndicate. After 90 minutes
behind closed doors, the other owners reconsidered and unani-
mously approved the move.' The league noted that Baltimore had
the enthusiasm, resources and facilities for a team. It also took
steps to alleviate the two concerns expressed after the last rejec-
tion vote. As a concession to those favoring movement to the West
Coast, the league voted to expand to ten teams if it determined
bringing baseball to that part of the country would be desirable.
Further, the league promised to make efforts not to have the new
Baltimore team and the neighboring Washington team play home
games on the same dates.'
The team owners' initial rejection of the Braves' move to Bal-
timore may be attributed to concerns regarding the home stadium
being ready for operation, and other logistical considerations.' 7
The second rejection, however, clearly resulted from the American
League owners' desire to force Veeck out of the league. Obviously,
Baltimore's enthusiasm did not change in two days, and neither
did the concessions granted suddenly become available.'8
C. Philadelphia Athletics to Kansas City (AL), 1955
Two teams in one city also presented a problem for the Phila-
42. Daley, supra note 40. See also Daley, After the Knockout, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,
1953, at 42, col. 2.
43. Sheehan, Baltimore Gets St. Louis Browns As Syndicate Buys Veeck Interest,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1953, at 1, col. 4.
44. Sheehan, Shift of Browns to Baltimore Rejected, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1953, at
28, col. 1. The owners heard delegations from five cities other than Baltimore, including Los
Angeles.
45. Id. In comparison, the league owners spent five hours in discussion before rejecting
the Browns' first request. Effrat, supra note 34. They spent 10 hours in discussion the sec-
ond time. Sheehan, supra note 44.
46. Sheehan, supra note 44.
47. Sheehan, Relocation of Team in Missouri Third Major Shift in 10 Months, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 9, 1954, at 33, col. 4.
48. For Veeck's account, see W. VEECK & E. LINN, VEECK-As IN WRECK 270-90, 299-
305 (1962).
1987]
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delphia Athletics. The Mack family, owners of the American
League Athletics, felt that the National League Phillies hindered
the Athletics home attendance."" The citizens of Kansas City were
actively seeking a team at this time. Prior to the league approving
a franchise, the citizens of Kansas City voted in favor of a two
million dollar bond issue to buy the Kansas City Blues Stadium
and to prepare it for major league baseball.5 0 The Kansas City
Merchants Association collected over one million dollars in ticket
sales for the next season's games."'
The Macks tentatively sold the Athletics to Chicago industri-
alist Arnold Johnson, who was planning to move the team to Kan-
sas City. The American League unanimously approved the shift to
Kansas City. One member of the Mack family, however, later tried
to sell the team to a Philadelphia syndicate.52 The American
League owners subsequently rejected the latter sale. Apparently
the owners felt the Macks were unable to agree on a buyer. This
resulted in the Macks retaining control of the debt-ridden club.
The proposed sale to Johnson and shift to Kansas City then went
back to the league owners for a vote. They approved the sale unan-
imously, and also approved the shift 6-2. 53
In voting for the shift to Kansas City, some owners apparently
were concerned that Arnold Johnson owned Yankee Stadium.
Johnson agreed, however, to divest his interest in the stadium.
This commitment swayed the Detroit team to vote for approval.54
Voting against the shift were the owners of the Washington Sena-
tors and the Cleveland Indians. Clark Griffith of Washington based
his opposition on the view that there are "bigger towns [such as
Toronto, Los Angeles, and Montreal .. .] that would give our
league better balance, '5 and that there would be added travel bur-
dens. 6 The obvious contradiction between Griffith's interest in
having a team in Los Angeles and his concern over travel burdens
indicates that these reasons were probably a smokescreen. Appar-
49. See N.Y. Times, July 2, 1954, at 12, col. 4 (the owners warned the Philadelphia
mayor that the team would move or be sold if attendance did not increase).
50. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1954, at 24, col. 3. As further inducement, the city offered the
Athletics a two-year lease for $25,000 a year. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964, § 5, at 2, col. 2.
51. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1954, at 14, col. 2.
52. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1954, at 35, col. 6.
53. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1954, at 33, col. 1. Kansas City officials went so far as to
assure the American League that the club could leave the city if it did not draw one million
fans a year for the first three years. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1954, § 5, at 1, col. 2.
54. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1954, at 33, col. 1.
55. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1954, at 25, col. 4.
56. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1953, at 29, col. 5.
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ently, Griffith's real reason for opposing the move was that Kansag
City would replace Baltimore as a Western division team. With
Baltimore as an Eastern division team, many of its home games
would conflict with those of Washington. 7
D. Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles (NL), 1958
New York Giants to San Francisco (NL), 1958
By 1958 both leagues thought of entering the expanding mar-
kets on the West Coast, but it was the National League that acted
first. The Brooklyn Dodgers laid the groundwork. They "traded"
their Texas League franchise in Ft. Worth to the Chicago Cubs in
exchange for the Cubs' Pacific Coast League franchise and
ballpark (Wrigley Field) in Los Angeles. After the "trade," Walter
O'Malley, president of the Dodgers, said that the team had no im-
mediate plans to move, but "I have tried to make people aware
that a serious condition faced us in Brooklyn, an inadequate and
outmoded park and especially the lack of parking facilities."" By
acquiring the Los Angeles franchise and park, the Dodgers in-
creased pressure on New York City to back the team's plan of
building a stadium in the heart of downtown Brooklyn as part of a
comprehensive rehabilitation of the area."
At the same time, the New York Giants0 were also in need of
a new stadium. The Giants' existing stadium, the Polo Grounds,
was obsolete, had traffic problems, and lacked adequate parking
space."
After meeting with Giants president Horace Stoneham, San
Francisco mayor George Christopher commented, "We are pre-
pared to pay the bill and when we get a club. . . we'll make a first
division team of it."'62 Christopher also authorized an appropria-
tion of five million dollars to build a modern stadium on a suitable
site contingent on obtaining a team in San Francisco. Christopher
further stated that "[i]f that is not sufficient, we are prepared to go
beyond that amount as much as necessary. 8
Shortly thereafter, the National League owners voted unani-
57. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1954, at 33, col. 1.
58. McGowen, supra note 6.
59. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1957, at 27, col. 1.
60. New York was also the home of the American League's Yankees.
61. Sheehan, New York's Baseball, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1957, at 17, col. 3. An alter-
native for the Giants was to share Yankee Stadium with the Yankees. The Giants appar-
ently regarded this as an undesirable situation and did not seriously pursue it. Id.
62. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1957, at 16, col. 3.
63. Id.
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mously to grant the move of the Dodgers and Giants to Los Ange-
les and San Francisco respectively. The league conditioned its af-
firmative vote by requiring that the requests to move be filed
before October 1, 1957, and that the teams make the move to-
gether. If only one team decided to move, the league would meet to
reconsider its position." The sentiment of the owners appeared to
be that anything the owners of the Dodgers and Giants wanted to
do with their clubs was acceptable. 5
Both teams were receptive to the idea of change. The Dodgers'
attendance the last six years averaged approximately 1.1 million, a
drop from its average of approximately 1.5 million the previous six
years. 6 The Giants, meanwhile, were concerned because in 1956
their attendance dropped below 800,000 (629,000) for the first
time.6 7 Sportswriters attributed the attendance problems of both
teams to obsolete facilities, saturation with televised baseball,68 in-
adequate parking and transportation," and the presence of harness
racing.70
Television money was another reason the teams were receptive
to moving. The Dodgers and the Giants realized $750,000 and
$600,000 respectively from their television contracts in New
York. 1 In the proposed locations both teams were negotiating ten
year pay-television contracts for two million dollars a year.72
The Dodgers and Giants tried to work with city officials to
64. Sheehan, Dodgers, Giants Win Right to Shift if They So Desire, N.Y. Times, May
29, 1957, at 1, col. 2. The teams were to move together in order to save money on travel
expenses. Each National League team played every other team eleven times at home and
eleven times away with four trips to each city in a year. A trip to the West Coast would cost
approximately $40,000 a year and with two teams located on the West Coast this cost would
be offset by anticipated gains in attendance. Sheehan, supra note 61.
65. Sheehan, supra note 64.
66. Quirk, supra note 6, at 52; Sheehan, supra note 61. Despite declining attendance,
the Dodgers had been one of the most profitable franchises in baseball. Perlmutter, Dodgers
Accept Los Angeles Bid to Move to Coast, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1957, at 1, col. 1; Quirk,
supra note 6, at 48, 53.
67. Quirk, supra note 6, at 52; Sheehan, supra note 61.
68. Sheehan, supra note 64. In New York, local stations televised 270 baseball games
including 231 home games. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1957, at 19, col. 4.
69. See Mooney, Stoneham Favors Giants' Transfer, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1957, at 1,
col. 5.
70. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1957, at 19, col. 4. Harness racing in New York outdrew all
three New York baseball teams combined. Boston and Philadelphia had major horse racing.
A franchise from each of these cities subsequently moved to Kansas City and Milwaukee,
cities without major horse racing. Id.
71. Benjamin, Mayor To Stress Baseball-TV Link, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1957, at 1,
col. 2.
72. Benjamin, Closed TV Linked to Baseball Shift, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1957, at 1,
col. 4.
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solve their problems,7 3 but these efforts were unsuccessful. The Gi-
ants were the first of the two teams to decide to make the move.
According to Stoneham, the Giants lost money in six of the last
eight years. Low attendance forced the Giants to move. Stoneham
believed that the team would realize a profit of $200,000-$300,000
in San Francisco. In part, the agreement between the club and the
city of San Francisco provided for the following: 1) construction of
a stadium with a seating capacity of 40,000-45,000; 2) a 35-year
lease at five percent of receipts after taxes and visiting club and
National League shares, with a minimum rental guarantee of
$125,000; 3) team operation and collection of revenue from all con-
cessions; 4) the city will equip the stadium with everything needed
for operation; 5) the city will also maintain the physical property,
but the club will pay for maintenance during the season; and 6) the
mayor will appoint a committee to promote the sale of season tick-
ets before the 1958 season."' The team was to play in 22,000-seat
Seals Stadium until the city could construct the new stadium. 5
The Dodgers followed suit when the Los Angeles City Council
approved an ordinance embodying the terms of a contract previ-
ously agreed upon by the club. The city agreed to provide a 185
acre tract of land in Los Angeles and two million dollars of prelim-
inary grading for the proposed stadium site. The county agreed to
provide 2.75 million dollars in access roads. In return, the Dodgers
would construct a ten million dollar stadium with a capacity of
50,000, give the city the PCL park, and construct recreational facil-
ities in conjunction with the stadium.7 6 Warren Giles, president of
the National League, summed up the moves: "The transfer of the
Giants and the Dodgers means that two more great municipalities
are to have major league baseball without depriving another city of
that privilege. 77
73. See N.Y. Times, February 22, 1957, at 16, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1957, at 27,
col. 1; Knowles, Wagner Striving to Keep Dodgers and Giants Here, N.Y. Times, May 30,
1957, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, July 18, 1957, at 51, col. 1.
74. Becker, Giants Will Shift to San Francisco for 1958 Season, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20,
1957, at 1, col. 1.
75. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1958, at 43, col. 1.
76. Hill, Dodger Pact Wins Los Angeles Vote, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1957, at 1, col. 1.
The Dodgers wanted 300 acres of land and the city promised to do what it could to facilitate
the acquisition of the other 115 acres from private landholders at a reasonable price. Id. See
also N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1957, at 37, col. 5.
77. Perlmutter, supra note 66.
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E. Washington Senators to Minnesota (AL), 1961
Calvin Griffith, owner of the Washington Senators, tried for
many years to move his team. Finally, in 1960, the American
League approved a shift of the franchise to Minneapolis-St. Paul
(the Twin Cities) by a 6-2 vote.78 The Twin Cities guaranteed one
million in attendance for the next five years, greatly increased TV
and radio revenues,7 9 and a new bond issue for expansion of the
stadium.80 Griffith stated that the move was for the "betterment of
our corporation." 81
F. Milwaukee Braves to Atlanta (NL), 1966
The Braves started the wave of franchise relocations in 1953
with its move from Boston to Milwaukee. In its first season in Mil-
waukee, the Braves set a National League record for attendance by
drawing over 1.8 million fans.2 Braves' attendance peaked with 2.2
million in 1957 and then declined steadily.8 3 Over its 12-year pe-
riod in Milwaukee, the Braves averaged more than 1.5 million fans
a year, 31 percent above the National League average.8 4 Nonethe-
less, the team reported losses of over $43,000 in 1963 and over
$45,000 in 1964. 85
A new ownership group took over the Braves in 1962. They
showed interest in moving to Atlanta in 1963.86 In 1964 Atlanta
tried to pry the team from Milwaukee by offering an 18 million
78. Drebinger, American League, in '61, to Add Minneapolis and Los Angeles, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 27, 1960, at 1, col. 4. Club owners approved this move in conjunction with a
decision to award expansion franchises to Washington and Los Angeles for the 1961 season.
Id.
79. Id.
80. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1960, at 46, col. 6. Minneapolis-St. Paul built the stadium in
1956 with a capacity of 22,000. The Twin Cities planned to expand the stadium to seat
40,000. Drebinger, supra note 78.
81. Drebinger, supra note 78.
82. Sheehan, supra note 43.
83. Durso, Braves Ready to Transfer Franchise From Milwaukee to Atlanta Next
Year, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1964, at 15, col. 1; Quirk, supra note 6, at 52.
84. L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 506.
85. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1965, § 5, at 2, col. 4. Had the Braves capitalized scouting
expenses as sound accounting methods require, the team would have realized net income of
approximately $170,000 in 1963 and $151,000 in 1964. The reported losses were also partly
due to reducing income by the interest paid on funds borrowed to purchase the team, and
expenses associated with relocation. Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699,
709, 144 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Wis.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966). See N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1966,
at 38, col. 3 (Ralph Delforge, secretary and assistant treasurer for the Milwaukee Braves
from 1961-65, stated that the team realized profits of $66,000 in 1963 and $73,000 in 1964).
86. Milwaukee Braves, 31 Wis. 2d at 703, 709, 144 N.W.2d at 2, 5.
[Vol. 4:19
14
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 4
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol4/iss1/4
FRANCHISE RELOCATION IN BASEBALL
dollar, 50,000-seat stadium and a seven state television network to
broadcast games. In contrast, teams in Minneapolis, 400 miles to
the west, and Chicago, 90 miles to the south, limited the Milwau-
kee television market.87
On October 21, 1964, the Braves' Board of Directors voted 12-
6 to request permission to shift to Atlanta." William Bartholomay,
the Braves' chairman of the board, explained the vote as being
based on economic considerations." The Milwaukee County Board
of Supervisors fought the decision to move in the courts. The
County Board sought to require fulfillment of the team's stadium
lease. Eugene Grobschmidt, chairman of the County Board, alleged
that local citizens supported the team and the recent drop in at-
tendance was due to "inexperienced management." Grobschmidt
further stated that the team was moving for the "lure of fast
money."90
The National League unanimously approved the Braves' move
for the 1966 season, but in response to the county's lawsuit, ruled
that the team must stay in Milwaukee for the 1965 season to fulfill
its stadium lease obligations. Warren Giles stated "it was in the
best future interests of baseball to have the club move to Atlanta
in 1966."l'
Ford Frick, commissioner of the major leagues, defended the
right of the Braves to move on the basis of an owner's responsibil-
ity to himself, his partners, and the team's shareholders: "He has
no responsibility to lose money, or stay where he can't get by, or
[stay] where it appears a city will not support big league base-
ball." 2 The feeling among the other owners was that an owner has
the right to move a club and they will not stand in the way, pro-
vided the city to which the owner wishes to move promises reason-
87. Durso, supra note 83.
88. The directors voting against the shift indicated that moving the Braves at this
time was a violation of a public trust. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1964, at 28, col. 2.
89. Durso, Braves Put Off Request to Move to Atlanta Because of a Restraining Or-
der, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1964, at 48, col. 1.
90. Id. Attendance for the Braves in 1963 was 773,000, and 911,000 in 1964. Id. Bill
Eberly, ticket manager and business manager of the Braves, believed that the drop in at-
tendance was due to a variety of reasons. He cited the slump in the team's performance,
management's failure to pass a reduction in federal excise tax on to season ticketholders, the
departure in 1959 of a popular general manager, an increase in ticket prices in 1961 and
1962, and the club management's refusal to permit televising games for the first 10 years in
Milwaukee. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1966, at 34, col. 7.
91. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1964, § 5, at 1, col. 1. The team's move to Atlanta for the 1966
season came after additional legal complications. See Milwaukee Braves, 31 Wis. 2d 699,
144 N.W.2d 1; L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 505-12.
92. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1965, at 21, col. 5.
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able support for the team."3 Philip Wrigley, owner of the Chicago
Cubs, was more blunt as he explained that he would approve the
move because "I don't know anything about the business of the
other nine National League teams, and I don't pretend to be able
to tell them how to run their businesses." '
Specifically, the team owners justified the move on the basis
that despite fan support, attendance had been declining. Further,
no sizable radio-TV package was possible in an area so close to
Chicago. They also noted that owners had a right to move their
investment to a more promising locale, and a club is not bound to
a city where offers to remain in that city are unsatisfactory. 5
G. Kansas City Athletics to Oakland (AL), 1968
Charles 0. Finley, owner of the Kansas City Athletics,96 re-
ceived the only other rejection of a formal request for franchise
relocation. Finley was at odds with Kansas City officials on the
terms for renewal of the stadium lease which expired on December
31, 1963. After several rounds of negotiations,97 the city offered to
set the rent at five percent of the paid attendance plus 7.5 percent
of the concession revenue for a four or five year period with op-
tions. Finley agreed to the terms of the rent but not to the length
of the lease. He wanted only two years with no options. The city
refused a short-term contract because it would keep alive the
threat of club relocation.9
Finley considered moving the team since 1961.11 His reaction
to the stalemated negotiations was to sign a contract with the state
of Kentucky to move the team there for the 1964 and 1965 seasons.
The Athletics agreed to sign a two-year lease to play at the State
Fairgrounds in Louisville and to pay rent under the same terms
93. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1964, at 45, col. 8.
94. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1964, at 28, col. 2.
95. Koppett, Senators Make Bid Today for Shift to Texas, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21,
1971, at 47, col..5. See also Milwaukee Braves, 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W. 2d 1.
96. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964, § 5, at 2, col. 2 (Finley became sole owner of the
team after pledging to keep the team in Kansas City).
97. Id.
98. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1964, at 18, col. 8.
99. In 1963, Finley's informal canvassing of owners about a move was thwarted. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 12, 1964, § 5, at 2, col. 2. Some believe Finley never intended to renew the lease.
Finley may have used his negotiations with Kansas City officials as publicity to win Ameri-
can League sympathy, and to create hostility with the city council. Id. For a more extensive
account of lease negotiations and threats to move, see H. MICHELSON, CHARLIE 0 121-30
(1975).
[Vol. 4:19
16
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 4
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol4/iss1/4
FRANCHISE RELOCATION IN BASEBALL
discussed with Kansas City."'0
Before the owners voted on the proposed move, Arthur C. Al-
lyn, owner of the Chicago White Sox, commented, "Finley is a fool
and his action is inexcusable. He has no right whatsoever to at-
tempt such a move. He has an obligation to the people of Kansas
City and he had better make it good."'' Joe Cronin, president of
the American League, expressed similar sentiments: "It is my per-
sonal opinion that the American League will not make a checker-
board of this franchise by moving it from place to place from year
to year. I would be very much against using the Kansas City
franchise ... as a wedge of a hammer against the Kansas City
people."1 02
The American League owners voted 9-1 against the move. Fin-
ley cast the only vote in favor of the move. The league warned
Finley that he had two weeks to solve the problems with his lease.
Otherwise, he could face expulsion from the league and forfeiture
of his franchise. 03 After the denial, Cronin stated that the league
partially based its decision on the fact that the Athletics outdrew
several other teams. Further, surveys showed that baseball gener-
ated interest among people in Kansas City."0 " Finley reacted
strongly and threatened legal action: "I don't feel baseball has the
right to force me to stay in the city where I am continually losing
money.' 0 5 Finley eventually accepted Kansas City's proposal for a
lease. ' 6
Attendance in Kansas City suffered after Finley's attempted
move. 10 7 With Oakland as the intended destination, Finley again
tried to move his team. 08 In a compromise decision, the American
100. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1964, at 29, col. 1.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Drebinger, American League Bars A's Move to Louisville in 9-1 Vote, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 17, 1964, at 26, col. 1; H. MICHELSON, supra note 99, at 131-32.
104. Drebinger, supra note 103.
105. Finley claimed to have lost over $1 million in three years in Kansas City. Id.
106. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1964, at 33, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1964, at 15, col. 1.
107. The team drew only 528,000 fans to the park during the 1965 season, but im-
proved to 774,000 the next year. Attendance dropped by over 100,000 fans in 1967. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 1967, at 59, col. 1. The team drew over one million only in its first two years
(1955 and 1956). Team performance did not aid attendance. The team finished at or near
the bottom of the American League every year. Its best finish was sixth place in 1955. Id.
After 1964, however, team management did little to promote the team. H. MICHELSON, supra
note 99, at 133-34.
108. The city of Oakland originally made overtures for the team in 1964 after club
owners turned down Finley's request to move to Louisville. Cronin refused to consider Fin-
ley's bid to make the move. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1964, at 38, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Feb. 19,
1964, at 45, col. 1.
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League voted 7-3 to allow the move and to expand to 12 teams,
locating the new franchises in Seattle and Kansas City.1"9 Two
teams explaining their votes were the Minnesota Twins and the
Baltimore Orioles. The Twins voted for the move because team
owner Calvin Griffith previously obliged his support for any future
request to move in exchange for support for his request to move
from Washington to the Twin Cities. The Orioles, however, voted
against the move because they feared that it would hurt the San
Francisco Giants. The Orioles also believed that the Athletics had
conducted inadequate market studies on the effect of the move."0
H. Seattle Pilots to Milwaukee (AL), 1970
The Seattle Pilots came into existence as an expansion
franchise in 1969 as part of the compromise allowing the Kansas
City Athletics to move to Oakland for the 1968 season.1 ' The Pi-
lots had immediate financial problems. In the first year the team
lost $850,000. The Pilots attracted only 678,000 fans to its modi-
fied minor league park which had a seating capacity of only
22,000."' There was friction between the team's owners and city
officials about rent and reconstruction of the park. Plans for a
domed stadium ran into political roadblocks. Personality differ-
ences and political rivalries between city officials and the team's
109. Koppett, American League Approves Shift of Athletics to Oakland, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 19, 1967, at 61, col. 1. The owners voted on the move and expansion as a single ques-
tion. Originally they approved the matter based on expansion occurring "no later than
1971." The league received considerable pressure on behalf of Kansas City, particularly
from congressmen, to continue baseball in the city without interruption. Consequently, the
league vowed it would take all action within its powers to field a team in Kansas City in
1969. Koppett, Giles Calls American League Expansion Plan Hasty, Urges Reconsidera-
tion, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1967, at 59, col. 1; Koppett, Transfer of Pilots to Milwaukee Seen
as Likely, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1969, at 55, col. 5. See H. MICHELSON, supra note 99, at 136-
39. Part of the pressure undoubtedly arose when Kansas City voters approved a bond issue
for a 45,000 seat stadium with a sliding roof. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1967, at 60, col. 5.
110. H. MICHELSON, supra note 99, at 137. The San Francisco Giants protested to the
commissioner, General William Eckert, that the move to Oakland was an invasion of its
territory. The commissioner did not allow the protest since the move did not violate the
territorial limits set by the American League. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Cf. Goldpaper, Nets Seeking to Move to Jersey, Sue Knicks Over Effort to Block It, N.Y.
Times, July 7, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
111. The American League move into Seattle may have been premature. The league
wanted to beat the National League into the market and moved in earlier than it desired.
The American League needed a twelfth team for balance after creating a team in Kansas
City to replace the club it allowed to move to Oakland. Koppett, Transfer of Pilots to Mil-
waukee Seen as Likely, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1969, at 55, col. 5.
112. Durso, American League Balked at Shifting Seattle Franchise by Restraining
Order, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1970, at 54, col. 1.
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owners, as well as residual bitterness over competition for the
franchise from the defeated groups compounded these problems.
The Pilots' ownership determined that there was no likelihood of
improving the situation and put the team up for sale." 8
A Milwaukee group emerged as a willing purchaser. Milwau-
kee had a stadium ready for occupancy and no political complica-
tions."4 The city also had a good history of attendance while the
Braves were there. One of Milwaukee's drawbacks was that Ameri-
can League teams in Minnesota ind Chicago had it hemmed in.
Further, it was being held out by the Chicago White Sox as a pos-
sible escape valve." 5
The league, however, wanted to keep the team in Seattle"'
and offered the team to a local syndicate at a price which would
represent "no profit." The league rejected the syndicate due to fi-
nancing problems.1 1 7 The league owners then put up $650,000 for
the team's current operating expenses in order to keep the team in
Seattle for 1970.18 The owners soon began having second thoughts
about throwing "good money after bad." The $650,000 would prob-
ably cover only part of the required operating expenses, and there
was no clear prospect of the franchise turning around in the fu-
ture." 9 These thoughts resulted in congressional threats to remove
baseball's antitrust exemption, and threats of lawsuits by state and
city officials. The owners faced a dilemma: keeping the team in Se-
attle would avoid threats of congressional retaliation, lawsuits, and
criticism for moving the franchise, but it would also cost up to
113. Koppett, supra note 111; Koppett, Pilots' Owners and Seattle Officials Told to
Work Out Agreement, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1969, at 37, col. 1.
114. Milwaukee's available stadium compared favorably against the troubles with Se-
attle's domed stadium and the delays in plans for the stadium in Montreal, a 1969 National
League expansion franchise. Koppett, supra note 111. Moreover, other cities interested in
the team, Dallas, Buffalo and Toronto, only had promises for stadiums. Koppett, Pilots'
Owners and Seattle Officials Told to Work Out Agreement, N.Y. Times., Oct. 22, 1969, at
37, col. 1.
115. Koppett, Seattle Franchise on the Brink, With Dallas Likely to Catch It, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 23, 1970, at 55, col. 3.
116. The league so desired to avoid the embarrassment of having an expansion
franchise fail within one year that it quashed an initial oral agreement to sell the Pilots to
interests in Milwaukee. Id.
117. Koppett, New Seattle Group Is Offered Chance to Buy Pilots for $9-Million,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1970, at 33, col. 1; Koppett, Pilots Keep Their Seattle Home, But
Foundation Remains Shaky, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1970, at 45, col. 2; Koppett, Seattle's
Choice: Legal or Money Woes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1970, at 50, col. 6.
118. Koppett, Pilots Keep Their Seattle Home, But Foundation Remains Shaky,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1970, at 45, col. 2.
119. Koppett, American League Weighs Shift of Pilots to Milwaukee Before Season's
Start, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1970, § 5, at 2, col. 1.
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three million dollars in first year expenses and five million dollars
over the next five years until the city of Seattle could build the
new stadium.120
The following considerations weighed in favor of allowing the
team to move: 1) the team's ownership would not realize a profit
from its failure; 2) the league's efforts to keep the team in Seattle
would enable them to defend an antitrust suit; 3) spending money
in defense of an antitrust suit seemed better than spending more
money on a losing situation and still facing a move the following
year; 4) Milwaukee's demonstrated ability to support a team; 5)
bringing baseball back to Milwaukee discharged a moral debt; and
6) it is advantageous for radio and television purposes to all other
franchises (except California and Oakland) to have a team in the
Central Daylight time zone rather than on the West Coast.
12 1
The Pilots' owners made the American League owners' deci-
sion easy. The Pilots' owners petitioned federal bankruptcy court
to sell the club. A federal bankruptcy referee granted the club per-
mission to be sold to Milwaukee, which had made the only actual
offer for the team.'22 The American League owners then unani-
mously voted to approve the transfer.123
I. Washington Senators to Texas (AL), 1972
San Diego Padres to Washington (NL), 1973
In 1968, Bob Short bought the Washington Senators for $9.5
million. In the next three years he reportedly lost a "substantial
amount" of money."" Short tried to turn things around by hiring
controversial baseball personality Ted Williams as manager, and
by acquiring players such as Denny McLain and Curt Flood.'25
120. Koppett, Seattle's Choice: Legal or Money Woes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1970, at
50, col. 6. The city of Seattle passed a $40 million bond issue for the stadium's construction.
The city sold $10 million of the bond issue but more realistic estimates set the stadium's
cost at $80 million. Koppett, supra note 118. The original agreement with the American
League provided that the team could move if construction of the domed stadium did not
begin by December 31, 1970. Koppett, Pilots' Owners and Seattle Officials Told to Work
Out Agreement, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1969, at 37, col. 1.
121. Koppett, supra note 118.
122. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1970, at 57 col. 2; N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1970, at 59, col. 2.
123. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1970, at 59, col. 2. It is presumed that the vote was unani-
mous. The vote was by telephone and any owner casting a dissenting vote could have called
for a formal meeting. Quirk, supra note 6, at 50 n.10. Seattle did file an antitrust suit
against the American League for allowing the team to move, but settled when promised an
expansion team which it received in 1977. Ringolsby, Shipwrecked in Seattle, SPORT, Mar.
1984, at 61, 63.
124. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1971, at 65, col. 8.
125. Durso, Believed to Have Votes, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1971, at 67, col. 3. McLain
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These moves did little to help attendance. Short testified before
Congress that he faced bankruptcy unless he received a new lease
for Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) Stadium. He asked that the District
of Columbia charge only one dollar per year rent up to one million
attendance. 1 6 Beyond that he would agree to any terms. At the
time, Short's lease required an annual payment of $135,000, gave
the team only a portion of the concessions, and no revenue from
parking.'27
Short received an offer to move the Senators to Dallas-Ft.
Worth. The offer permitted him either to sell the team for $12 mil-
lion, or retain it and receive more than one million dollars in radio
and television rights, and other financing. 28 The team would play
in Turnpike Stadium in Arlington which would be expanded to
seat 50,000. Rent would consist of one dollar per year until the
team's attendance exceeded one million.1
29
Short decided to continue as owner and put the move to a
league vote. League owners approved the move 10-2 contingent on
the lease terms and the number of spectator seats in the sta-
dium.1 30 Most of the owners approved the move because they be-
lieved that Short should be able to do whatever he wanted with his
club. The other clubs approved the Senators' move because Balti-
more's proximity limited radio and television rights in the Wash-
ington area, as well as the team's poor attendance history.'
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn wanted to keep the team in Wash-
ington, fearing that a move would stir up congressional antitrust
action. The Baltimore Orioles and the Chicago White Sox cast
"no" votes for other reasons. The move to Texas would clear the
Washington area for the Orioles, but the Orioles feared that a Na-
tional League team, probably the San Diego Padres, would move to
Washington and hurt their attendance. The friendship between
lost 22 games for Washington in 1971, and Flood left the team after one month. One colum-
nist said that Short, who acted as the team's general manager, was "hornswaggled in every
trade." Daley, Washington Without a Farewell Address, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1971, at 49,
col. 1.
126. Durso, supra note 125. Washington drew over one million fans only in 1946. Id.
127. Id. The federal government owned RFK Stadium and the D. C. Armory Board
administered it. As of July 1971, Short owed $135,000 of the 1970 rent and $26,000 on the
1971 rent. Id.
128. Koppett, Senators Make Bid Today for Shift to Texas, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21,
1971, at 47, col. 5.
129. Short termed the lease arrangement as putting him in "a more favorable position
than any major league operator that I know of." N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1971, at 57, col. 8.
130. Id.
131. Koppett, supra note 128.
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White Sox owner John Allyn and Joseph Danzansky most likely
influenced the White Sox vote. Danzansky, a Washington business-
man, wanted to purchase the Senators to keep baseball in
Washington."3 2
In May 1973, Joseph Danzansky reappeared as a potential
baseball owner. Danzansky, head of a three man syndicate, agreed
to purchase the San Deigo Padres for $12 million from Padres
owner C. Arnholt Smith. The sale was contingent on National
League approval and the ability to terminate the lease for munici-
pally-owned San Diego stadium. Danzansky intended to transfer
the team to Washington, D.C. 1 3 The Padres made a small profit in
1972, but Smith was suffering from financial problems.""
The city of San Diego was upset about the sale. It built a $27
million stadium when the team came into existence as a result of
expansion in 1969. Other tenants would not generate sufficient in-
come to justify the stadium's expense. The Padres entered into a
20-year lease through 1988 for the stadium.'35 The city requested
an injunction to restrain the team from moving. It alleged that the
plans to sell the team constituted a breach of the lease which
would result in damages of $12 million.3 6
132. Koppett, supra note 118. Prior to the vote, observers speculated that the Oakland
and Cleveland owners might vote against the Senators move to keep Dallas open for poten-
tial moves by their teams. Id.
133. L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 515; Goldpaper, Padres Are Sold to a Washington
Group, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1973, at 43, col. 1. Danzansky arranged for a 12-year lease for
RFK Stadium in Washington, D.C. He would pay 10 cents per fan up to one million custom-
ers and 30 cents per customer over that. He would also receive all concession income. This
more attractive lease than the one provided previous owner Robert Short reflected an effort
to help the new ownership bring baseball back to Washington. Goldpaper, Padres Are Sold
to a Washington Group, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1973, at 43, col. 1. There was also congres-
sional pressure on major league baseball to place a franchise in Washington, D.C. See L.
SOBEL, supra note 1, at 526-29; Goldpaper, Padres Are Sold to a Washington Group, N.Y.
Times, May 29, 1973, at 43, col. 1; Shift of Padres to Washington a Political Move, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 9, 1973, §5, at 2, col. 1.
134. Goldpaper, Padres Are Sold to a Washington Group, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1973,
at 43, col. 1. Smith borrowed the $10 million necessary to purchase the expansion franchise.
Already experiencing financial difficulties, Smith's resources were being further drained by
interest payments of $700,000 on that loan. Id.; San Diego Is Surprised, May Go to Court,
N.Y. Times, May 29, 1973, at 45, col. 1. In contrast, the team realized a profit of $50,000 in
1972. Id.
135. L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 515-16; San Diego Is Surprised, May Go to Court,
supra note 134. The city also put $1.5 million into the team as a subsidy to enable the team
to promote increased use of the stadium. Id.
136. The city initially filed for an injunction on the basis that it would suffer substan-
tial and irreparable harm if the team left, but this injunction was denied. It then amended
its complaint to specify damages lost as result of lost revenues over the 15-year balance of
the lease. L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 516-22.
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The National League owners voted unanimously to give the
city 30 days to find a buyer to keep the team in San Diego."'3 The
city was unable to do so. The owners then conditionally approved
the sale to Danzansky. Danzansky had to indemnify the National
League and its teams from any liability that might arise out of law-
suits filed by the city."3 8
The city filed an antitrust action, alleging that the owners con-
spired to restrain and monopolize major league baseball and the
business of operating sports arenas.13 9 Danzansky's failure to ar-
range for the indemnity as required resulted in ownership shifting
back to Smith on December 21.1" Smith eventually sold the team
to Ray Kroc, chairman of the board of McDonald's Corporation. 4'
Kroc promised to keep the team in San Diego until at least 1980
and to personally pay any indemnity if the team moved thereaf-
ter." 2 The National League owners unanimously approved the
sale. 143
IV. SUMMARY OF FRANCHISE RELOCATIONS
At least one sports law scholar views the two instances where
owners voted down moves as punishment for the aberrant behavior
of the individuals involved-Veeck and Finley. This is indicated
by the owners' unanimous approval of the move from St. Louis to
Baltimore once Veeck sold the franchise. Furthermore, the owners
approved Finley's move to Oakland only after he suffered four
more years of reported heavy losses in Kansas City. 14 '
137. League Puts Off Verdict On Padres for 30 Days, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1973, at 12,
col. 5.
138. L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 524-25; Koppett, Padres Shift to Washington Granted,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1973, at 51, col. 8.
139. L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 529-30. San Diego alleged that the National League
used its monopoly power to move the franchise without regard to existing legal commit-
ments to remain in San Diego. Id.
140. L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 530; League is Reconsidering Padres' Shift, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 22, 1973, at 15, col. 4. Two congressmen assured the league that it would be
indemnified by the city of Washington if a lawsuit was brought. Washington Opens Arms
for Padres, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at 51, col. 5; Shift of Padres to Washington a Political
Move, supra note 133. Those promises were not kept.
141. L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 532. Smith originally announced the sale of the team to
Marjorie Everett, but the National League owners voted against the sale. No reason was
given, but it was probably due to Everett's involvement in a Chicago racetrack scandal that
led to the bribery conviction of former Illinois Governor Otto Kerner. Id. at 531.
142. L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 532; Padres' New Owner Expects Approval, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 26, 1974, at 23, col. 6.
143. L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 532; N.L. Owners Accept Sale of Padres, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 1, 1974, at 20, col. 1.
144. See Quirk, supra note 6, at 50. Owners may have feared an antitrust suit by
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Excluding the cases of Veeck and Finley, owners traditionally
have not opposed any of the formally proposed moves, including
the controversial moves of successful Brooklyn and Milwaukee
teams. Team owners approved franchise moves from three cities
(Washington, Kansas City, and New York) to which they later
gave expansion franchises.
Many observers regard franchise moves as the result of an ir-
resistible offer to an owner to sell the franchise to an offeror based
in another city. Actually, only three of the ten franchise moves in-
volved a change of ownership. 45 An ownership change occurred in
the Browns' move where the league in effect forced Veeck to sell
before the move could be approved. Desperate financial straits en-
couraged a change in ownership when the Mack family moved the
Athletics to Kansas City. The Pilots' ownership group declared
bankruptcy, resulting in the move to Milwaukee. Typically, a
franchise move occurs because a franchise owner sees higher profit
potential in some other location, not because the owner is contem-
plating a sale to parties in another city.
When an owner determines that greater profit opportunities
exist in another city, it is obviously in his interest to move to that
city. Moreover, such a move usually supports the interests of the
other team owners. First, the owners share the increased gate re-
ceipts and network TV revenues. Second, moves which tend to bal-
ance revenue potential also tend to balance playing strengths
among league members, consequently increasing public interest
and total league revenues. Third, by voting for a relocation, owners
of marginal franchises establish precedents for future requests to
move. Additionally, wealthier club owners may feel that franchise
moves delay substantive changes in league rules to share revenues
more equally. Fourth, rejecting a proposed move would generate
financial losses for both the proposing and visiting teams. Due to
these factors, league owners can be expected to routinely approve
proposed moves.146
Franchise owners usually justify proposed moves with lack of
fan support evidenced by low attendance and monetary losses. The
proposed move of the St. Louis Browns to Baltimore evidenced a
lack of fan support over a number of years. In other cases, such as
Finley if they rejected his second request to move. Daley, The General's Hot Potato, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 18, 1967, at 64. col. 2.
145. The proposed move from San Diego to Washington would have involved a change
in ownership, but the San Diego owner was stopped by financial difficulties.
146. Quirk, supra note 6, at 46-7.
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the Boston Braves' move to Milwaukee and then to Atlanta, it only
represented a recent trend. 47
The key factors affecting attendance are team performance
and the population of the area market."4 8 Six of the clubs that
moved (St. Louis Browns, Philadelphia Athletics, Washington Sen-
ators (twice), Kansas City Athletics, and Seattle Pilots) were
poorly performing teams that would have had difficulty drawing
fan support regardless of location. Thus, establishing attendance
problems as a true indication of fan nonsupport would have been
difficult for these teams."" In contrast, four clubs (Brooklyn Dodg-
ers, Milwaukee Braves, New York Giants, and Boston Braves) ac-
tually drew substantial crowds until the last two or three years
before moving.5 0 ,
A franchise may increase its revenue potential if it moves to
an area of greater population. Increased population offers a possi-
bility of greater fan support.' 5 ' Based on this criteria, only the
moves from St. Louis to Baltimore, Kansas City to Oakland, and
Brooklyn to Los Angeles increased revenue potential. The Athlet-
ics' move from Kansas City to Oakland, however, created a two-
team area and reduced the drawing potential of the San Francisco
Giants. Two franchises moved to areas of significantly greater pop-
ulation, while three others (Boston to Milwaukee, Milwaukee to
Atlanta, and Seattle to Milwaukee) moved to cities of essentially
equal size. 52
Notably, five franchises that moved were "second teams" in
multiple-team cities. Although these teams relocated to smaller
population areas, becoming the only franchise improved their fi-
nancial viability. 153 Their moves did not deny baseball to anyone,
but increased the availability of baseball to the national
population.
Franchise owners also justify proposed moves with the lure of
increased television revenues. Only four of the ten franchise moves
yielded an immediate increase in television revenues. 54 Although
147. Quirk, supra note 6, at 51-2.
148. J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 21, at 67-73.
149. Quirk, supra note 6, at 48-9.
150. Id. at 51-3.
151. Id. at 59; J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 21, at 72.
152. See Quirk, supra note 6, at 57, 59. In fact, in eight of the ten moves, the city
awarded the franchise had a population less than the league average per franchise. This
resulted in two additional franchise moves (Milwaukee, Kansas City). Id.
153. J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 21, at 108.
154. Quirk, supra note 6, at 53, 57. For the moves discussed in this article, the impact
on television revenues was as follows:
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the prospect of pay TV did not live up to its promise, it figured
prominently in the moves of the Dodgers and Giants. 5" Similarly,
television revenues in Texas remained unchanged though influen-
tial in the Washington Senators' move to Texas. Television reve-
nues played an important role in over half of the baseball franchise
moves. 
56
Team owners rationalize that stadium problems justify ap-
proval of franchise moves. The Brooklyn Dodgers, New York Gi-
ants, and Seattle Pilots each contended that they needed a new
stadium. Receiving cities offered the Boston, St. Louis, and Mil-
waukee clubs modern stadiums. Similarly, receiving cities offered
the former Philadelphia and Washington teams stadium expansion
and improvement. Sweetheart leases often accompanied these sta-
dium inducements, particularly in the Washington move to Texas
which involved a dispute over lease terms. Stadium considerations
figured in almost all the moves. Cities try to attract or retain teams
through construction of publicly financed stadiums or artificially
low rental charges.157
There is no clear indication from published accounts of the
voting on proposed moves how much owners considered any of the
above-mentioned factors. The baseball commissioner, when an-
nouncing franchise relocation, usually stated that the moves were
in the "best interests" of baseball. Many accounts suggest that the
owners believe that a team's owner is the best judge of the situa-
tion and should be allowed to do what the best interests of their
team dictates. Where accounts indicate particular owner concerns
regarding moves, the factors considered included proximity to ex-
isting franchises, population, potential for fan support, available
-Boston to Milwaukee -$175,000 (1953 v. 1952)
-St. Louis to Baltimore + 257,000 (1954 v. 1953)
-Philadelphia to Kansas City - 90,000 (1955 v. 1954)
-Brooklyn to Los Angeles not available
-New York to San Francisco not available
-Washington to Minnesota + 400,000 (1961 v. 1960)
-Milwaukee to Atlanta + 800,000 (1966 v. 1964)
-Kansas City to Oakland + 800,000 (1968 v. 1966)
-Seattle to Milwaukee - 150,000 (1970 v. 1969)
-Washington to Texas no change (1972 v. 1971)
155. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
156. Quirk, supra note 6, at 53, 57.
157. This was also the factor presented by Finley as his reason for requesting the
move from Kansas City to Louisville. Johnson, Municipal Administration and the Sports
Franchise Relocation Issue, 43 PUB. ADMIN. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 519. Similarly, RFK
Stadium offered lower rental rates when attempting to lure the San Diego Padres to
Washington.
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stadium, stadium rent, other attractions competing for the en-
tertainment dollar, and threats of lawsuits and congressional ac-
tion. Owners considered these factors while acting for the good of
the league and their own team. The owners are not consistent in
their application of the factors when they consider franchise
moves.
It appears that the owners' primary consideration in deciding
whether to vote for a proposed move is past fan support and the
potential fan support at the proposed site. Owners suggested that
fan support was a reason they voted against the only two denied
proposed moves. Yet both leagues allowed shifts of adequately
supported franchises, such as the Dodgers and the Milwaukee
Braves, in the apparent hope of making a quick gain. 5 ' Financial
distress may have been a key factor in the first moves, particularly
in the moves from St. Louis to Baltimore and from Philadelphia to
Kansas City. As interest shifted to the West Coast, however, the
motive for moves appeared to change to television revenues and
playing facilities built with public funds." 9 The team owners con-
sistently approved these requests without much opposition or
explanation.
V. DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCHISE RELOCATION
A. Court Cases
The first court decision regarding a challenge to league restric-
tions on franchise relocation was in a case brought by the San
Francisco Seals of the National Hockey League (NHL).6 ° The
Seals experienced financial difficulty in San Francisco and per-
ceived greater market potential in Vancouver, British Columbia.
The NHL Board of Governors denied the Seals' request to move to
Vancouver. The Seals filed suit claiming that the NHL rule requir-
ing unanimous approval of franchise relocations violated federal
antitrust laws.' e6
The court granted summary judgment to the NHL. The court
noted that to violate the antitrust laws there must be at least two
independent business entities, and one entity must be restraining
158. Note, supra note 9, at 430.
159. Johnson, supra note 157, at 521-22.
160. San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal.
1974). For a more complete discussion of the case, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note
13, at 698-706.
161. San Francisco Seals, 379 F. Supp. at 968.
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the operation of the other. It concluded that in this case there was
only a single entity. All members of the NHL act together as one
single business enterprise. They do not compete with each other.
The plaintiff was a member in this enterprise, and therefore, no
violation of the antitrust laws was found."0 2
Based on the Seals precedent it appears that owners of profes-
sional baseball franchises are a single entity, immune from suit
against each other for violation of antitrust laws.' The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals dealt the single entity concept a severe blow
in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Foot-
ball League.'" This case arose in early 1980 when Al Davis, gen-
eral managing partner of the Oakland Raiders, announced that the
Raiders would move to the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum to fill
the void left by the Los Angeles Rams relocation to Anaheim in
1978. The other NFL owners voted 22-0 (five abstentions) to deny
the Raiders permission to move. 16 5 The Coliseum and the Raiders
then initiated suit against the NFL in which they alleged that the
system requiring three-fourths vote of the owners to approve a
move violated the Sherman Act.
The Ninth Circuit found that since individual clubs have iden-
tities sufficiently distinct from the NFL, the NFL was not a single
entity for purposes of the federal antitrust law and, therefore could
be held liable for conspiring to unreasonably restrain trade by
blocking the Raiders' move into another team's territory.166
The court analyzed whether the goals of the franchise reloca-
tion rule could be achieved in a manner less harmful to competi-
tion. The court recognized that the rule insulated each team from
competition within its market. This allowed each team to set mo-
nopoly prices in its market and to foreclose competition among
stadiums wishing to secure NFL tenants. The court also recognized
that there must be some control over placement. Placing limits on
162. Id. at 969-71.
163. For discussion of the advantages of single entity theory, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 9-24.
164. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). For more complete
discussions of the case, see Kurlantzick, supra note 15; Glick, supra note 15; Weistart,
League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition and Cooperation
in the Sports Industry, 1984 DuKE L. J. 1013 (1984); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note
13, at 136-62 (Supp. 1985); Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation
Restrictions on Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157 (1984).
165. 726 F.2d at 1385.
166. The court based this finding on three grounds: 1) each franchise has an indepen-
dent value; 2) other entities "just as unitary" as the NFL have been found to violate anti-
trust laws; and 3) other courts have rejected the single entity concept. 726 F.2d at 1388-90.
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franchise relocation will, inter alia, maintain local confidence, keep
up fan interest, allow local governments time to recover the ex-
penditures incurred in getting a team, and ensure NFL popularity
in a diverse group of markets for its television contract."'7
The court concluded that the NFL's goals could be achieved in
ways that are less harmful to competition than its current restric-
tions on relocation. Franchise relocation rules did not set limits or
standards to ensure that team owners consider a requesting
owner's investment and fan loyalty before voting on proposed relo-
cations. The NFL argued that owners did not need such guidelines
because their desire to make profits will lead them to make reason-
able decisions. The court responded that in accord with the rule,
an opposing owner required only seven friendly votes to keep an-
other team from moving into his market area. The court believed
that it could rely on the market to deter unwise moves.16
The NFL failed to show that transferring the Raiders to Los
Angeles would have a detrimental effect on the league or any other
team. The court believed that the market was large enough for two
teams. Further, adequate facilities were available, and regional bal-
ance would not be disturbed.169
The Ninth Circuit explained the significance of the L.A. Coli-
seum decision in National Basketball Association v. SDC Basket-
ball Club, Inc.17 0 First, the court stated that the rule of reason
analysis governs a professional sports league's efforts to restrict
franchise movement because the ability of a franchise to move will
depend on the facts of each case. The NFL's franchise movement
rule was invalid only as applied to the Raiders move to Los Ange-
les. Thus, a franchise movement rule is not per se invalid, but will
depend on the reasonableness of the restraint involved.17 1 Second,
the court tried to guide leagues toward objective factors and proce-
167. Id. at 1395-96.
168. Id. at 1396. The court also noted that testimony indicated some owners disliked
Al Davis and considered him a maverick. The court commented that the vote against the
Raiders' move could have been motivated by animosity rather than by business judgment.
Id. at 1398.
169. 726 F.2d at 1397.
170. 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987). When the San Diego Clippers moved to Los Angeles
without prior league approval, the NBA brought a declaratory action seeking to establish its
right to sanction unauthorized team movement. The district court granted the Clippers'
motion for summary judgment. 815 F.2d at 565. The circuit court reversed the summary
judgment and remanded the case to the district court to resolve the "pervasive issues of
material fact." Id. at 570.
171. Id. at 564, 567-68. See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National
Football League, 791 F.2d 1381, 1396 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
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dures which will demonstrate procompetitive purposes. 172 It in-
vited leagues to play an active role in evaluating proposed
franchise shifts, provided such standards are drawn no more
broadly than necessary to protect justifiable league interests. 173
L.A. Coliseum probably has no legal effect with regard to ma-
jor league baseball. Baseball, in contrast to football and other
sports and forms of entertainment, has long been exempt from the
federal antitrust laws. The antitrust issue in baseball came before
the Supreme Court in 1922 in Federal Baseball Club v. National
League, 74 in which a unanimous court found that exhibitions of
baseball were purely state affairs, were not trade or commerce in
the commonly accepted use of those words, and the interstate
transportation of players was merely incidental. Since Section One
of the Sherman Act speaks of commerce among the states, 75 base-
ball was held not to be within the scope of the federal antitrust
laws.'
The nature of the baseball business has changed dramatically
since 1922: players are transported not only across state lines but
also international boundaries, materials are purchased in interstate
commerce, radio and television activities reach across state lines,
and organized "farm systems" of minor league clubs are located
across the country. 77 In fact, the Supreme Court has since ac-
knowledged that baseball is a business engaged in interstate
commerce.
178
Nonetheless, the courts have adhered to Federal Baseball, re-
fusing to apply the antitrust laws to baseball primarily because
baseball has developed by relying on the understanding that it is
not subject to antitrust laws and because of the lack of congres-
sional action since 1922.'17 On the other hand, the courts have used
modern interpretations of the commerce clause to find that other
sports and forms of entertainment are businesses involved in inter-
state commerce.180 In the process, court cases exempting baseball
172. 815 F.2d at 568.
173. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 13, at 148-52.
174. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
175. Section One of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 (1986), provides that "[elvery con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
176. Federal Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 208.
177. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357-61 (1953) (Burton, J., dis-
senting); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 287 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
178. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
179. Toolson, 346 U.S. 356; Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
180. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-3; see also Radovich v. National Football League, 352
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from the antitrust laws have been specifically limited to their facts,
that is, the business of organized professional baseball. 8 '
The exemption of baseball from the federal antitrust laws
clearly applies to "agreements and rules which provide for the
structure of the organization of major league baseball and the deci-
sions which are necessary steps in maintaining it."'8 2 Since
franchise relocation decisions concern the structure and organiza-
tion of baseball, they fall within the sport's exemption from anti-
trust scrutiny and would not be subject to a successful challenge in
court.183
Thus far only one court has addressed baseball's franchise re-
location procedure. The state of Wisconsin filed an antitrust suit
seeking to enjoin the Milwaukee Braves attempted move to At-
lanta.' The complaint alleged that the National League did not
exercise reasonable controls over team movement and did not fol-
low reasonable procedures when issuing new franchises. After find-
ing the attempted move in violation of state antitrust rules, the
trial court enjoined the Braves from playing home games in any
city or place other than Milwaukee. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin dismissed the action on the grounds that baseball was
exempt from state and federal antitrust laws and therefore the ac-
tions could not be reviewed.' 85 Curiously, the Braves move to At-
lanta eliminated competition for spectators between Milwaukee
County Stadium and the two baseball stadiums in Chicago, Wrig-
ley Field and Comiskey Park.186 Although this move was inconsis-
tent with the competition issue addressed in L.A. Coliseum the
court did not reach it in the baseball context because of the anti-
trust exemption; thus highlighting the inapplicability of the L.A.
Coliseum reasoning to baseball.
Furthermore, several decisions involving the authority of the
commissioner of major league baseball also treat baseball differ-
ently than the court treated football in L.A. Coliseum. The most
recent and significant of these cases was Charles 0. Finley & Co.,
Inc. v. Kuhn.187 In that case, Finley, owner of the Oakland Athlet-
U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955); Haywood v. National Bas-
ketball Association, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
181. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282; Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451.
182. Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 725, 144 N.W.2d 1, 15
(Wis.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966).
183. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 13, at 157 n.149 (Supp. 1985).
184. 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1.
185. Id.
186. 1966 CCH Trade Cases at 82013.
187. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
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ics, tried to sell the contracts of outfielder Joe Rudi and relief
pitcher Rollie Fingers to the Boston Red Sox for $2 million and
starting pitcher Vida Blue to the New York Yankees for $1.5 mil-
lion. Commissioner Bowie Kuhn disapproved the assignments of
these contracts "as inconsistent with the best interests of baseball,
the integrity of the game and the maintenance of public confidence
in it."'88 Oakland filed suit alleging that the act was beyond the
scope of the commissioner's authority. The court upheld the com-
missioner's authority to block the transaction because the league
constitution empowered him to prevent actions which he consid-
ered detrimental to the best interests of baseball.189
Under L.A. Coliseum, the Oakland baseball club would have
had the right to set its own "independent management policies re-
garding . . . players." 190 The court could have found the commis-
sioner's assertion of authority improper since the dispute in Finley
involved players directly under contract with the plaintiff's club
and the decision to assign the contracts was intimately involved in
the owner's efforts to maximize his economic advantage. The Fin-
ley court did not find any legal principle limiting the league's exer-
cise of centralized control and therefore held the commissioner's
assertion of power proper. Other cases involving the major league
baseball commissioner's powers to discipline league clubs and their
owners follow a similar line of thought.19 These cases seem at odds
with the finding of club independence in L.A. Coliseum, indicating
that only in baseball does an individual club not have the right to
assert independence on matters that other co-venturers within the
league deem important to them. The league is empowered to exer-
cise centralized control. 92
B. Congressional Action
Congress has long been interested in sports and has the power
188. Id. at 531. In taking this action, the Commissioner expressed concern for the fol-
lowing: 1) debilitation of the Oakland club; 2) lessening of the competitive balance of profes-
sional baseball through the buying of success by the more affluent clubs; and 3) the unset-
tled circumstances of baseball's reserve system. Id.
189. 569 F.2d at 539-40.
190. 726 F.2d at 1390.
191. Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D.
Ga. 1977) (upholding the commissioner's suspension of an owner for violating the Major
League Rules and provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement); Milwaukee American
Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (upholding the commissioner's disapproval of
an option contract between the St. Louis Browns of the American League and the Milwau-
kee Brewers of the minor leagues).
192. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 13, at 142-43 (Supp. 1985).
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to legislate away baseball's antitrust exemption. Congressional
threats to do so generally occur after a city loses or fails to obtain a
franchise. '93 Recently, Congress considered protecting cities which
give considerable financial support to their teams. Congress felt
that cities which provide adequate facilities to keep from losing
sports franchises to cities promising greener pastures deserved fair
and equitable treatment from their teams."'
Currently before Congress is S.782, known as the Professional
Sports Community Protection Act of 1987.198 This bill is intended
to stabilize community, team, and league relationships by ensuring
equitable consideration of community interests while preserving
league self-regulation.'96
The bill stipulates that professional sports leagues may en-
force intraleague team relocation rules provided they satisfy cer-
tain procedural and substantive requirements. Procedurally, the
bill requires the team owner give notice of a proposed change in
home territory at least six months before the commencement of
the season in which the club is to play in its new location. The bill
also requires that the league conduct proceedings on the request.' 7
The Act goes on to detail 13 factors that the league should con-
sider when determining whether a change in the location of the
home territory is justified.1 8 The league's determination on the re-
193. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1953, at 38, col. 2 (Maryland congressmen ask for
Justice Department inquiry of rejection of Browns' transfer to Baltimore); Koppett, supra
note 118 (Senator Magnuson of Washington threatened Commissioner Kuhn with congres-
sional retaliation if Seattle Pilots were allowed to move).
194. See Wong, Flight of the Pro Franchises, ATHLETIc BUSINESS, Sept. 1986, at 10-14.
The L.A. Coliseum case triggered Congress' most recent flurry of activity. The Raiders left
Oakland with a publicly-financed stadium built especially for the team, and with an annual
debt service on that facility of $1.5 million through the year 2006, despite receiving strong
fan support and high profits. S. Rep. No. 99-69, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1985).
195. This legislation currently is in committee with no hearings scheduled. The bill is
similar in purpose and structure to S.259, the Professional Sports Community Protection
Act of 1985. Hearings were held on that bill and a committee report was issued, but the bill
was never passed by Congress. S. 782, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. § 4 (1987).
196. Id.
197. Id. at § 5.
198. Id. at § 6. In determining whether a change is justified, the statute requires that
the league consider:
1) the adequacy of the stadium;
2) the adequacy of the facilities related to the stadium;
3) the willingness and ability to remedy any inadequacies in the stadium or
related facilities;
4) the extent of the club's public financial support;
5) the effects on any of the club's contracts;
6) the extent to which the club has contributed to the need to move;
7) the amount of the club's operating revenues from sports operations;
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location would be subject to judicial review.199 Professional base-
ball is conspicuously absent from the list of sports to which this
bill applies. This law does not appear to regulate any aspect of
baseball."'
According to Peter Ueberroth, commissioner of major league
baseball, "[b]aseball has a long standing policy of retaining teams
in their home area where at all possible" and has a solid record of
franchise stability.2 01 Ueberroth adopted a strong stance against
franchise relocations. He believes that
teams are part of the community where they are situated....
[Blaseball belongs to the community. It belongs to the fans.
Maybe not in a legal sense, but in more of a moral sense. So,
especially in some of the smaller markets, if they're operated by
a group of individuals or an individual and they lose a little
money but serve the community well, that's all right as far as
I'm concerned.2
2
Teams wanting to move are thus confronted with a commissioner
who will "just flat stop them," nor allow a sale to ownership in
another city.20 3
8) the extent of any net operating losses over the last three years;
9) the extent of fan support;
10) the effect on and number of professional teams playing the same sport in
the club's home territory and proposed location;
11) any bona fide offer to purchase the club;
12) the extent to which the club has engaged in good faith negotiations to re-
main in its home territory; and
13) any other factors that the league views as appropriate under the circum-
stances.
Id.
199. The league decision can be set aside by a court only if the court finds the decision
was not supported by substantial evidence or was obtained by fraud or undue means. Id. at
§7.
200. S.782 defines "professional sports team" as "any group of professional athletes
organized to play major league football, basketball or hockey..." Id. at § 3 (8). For legisla-
tion which included baseball, see S.287, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985).
201. Hearings, supra note 7, at 55 (statement of Ueberroth).
202. Deford, The Boss Takes His Cuts, SP. ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 15, 1985 at 100, 104.
203. Id. Bowie Kuhn also asserted that he had the right as commissioner to veto any
proposed franchise relocation if he determined that such a move was not in the best inter-
ests of baseball. Koppett, supra note 111.
A move by one of the two teams in the Bay Area is the only possible exception for
franchise relocation left open by Ueberroth. Deford, supra note 202, at 104. In fact, Ueber-
roth recently acted to block a potential move. In 1984, there was some concern that the
Minnesota Twins would leave Minneapolis, but Ueberroth promised interested parties that
an application for transfer would not be approved if a fair purchase offer on terms giving
reasonable assurance of a successful operation were available in Minneapolis. Such an offer
was made and the team has remained in Minneapolis. Hearings, supra note 7, at 55 (state-
ment of Ueberroth). See also id. at 58 (statement of Durso).
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is unfair to deprive baseball businessmen of the opportunity
to improve their failing businesses by moving them. On the other
hand, a community makes a large investment, financially and emo-
tionally, in the business of baseball and it too should have rights.
The institution of baseball has not formally recognized the com-
munity's rights. Rather, baseball recognizes the community's rights
only when it also serves the league's purposes, resulting in the de-
nial of a relocation request. Owners are unlikely to take a stand to
protect the fan's interests. Instead, they tend to rely on their fel-
low owners' assessment of the situation and support the move to
gain reciprocity in the event they may wish to move their own
franchise in the future.204
Baseball has operated on a rule requiring affirmative votes for
relocation without any guidelines for determining the appropriate-
ness of the move. Thus, each club votes on its own subjective inter-
pretation of how a proposed move will affect its own profitability.
Factors considered will vary from team to team. Past cases regard-
ing proposed franchise moves give some indication of which factors
are considered, but provide no consistent basis for evaluation.
Since there are no standards to follow, there is no guarantee the
vote will be procompetitive. The vagueness of the system encour-
ages its use as a weapon against unpopular owners.2"5 These weak-
nesses will stand out the next time a baseball team goes to move
and that move is challenged in court or by Congress.
The business of professional baseball appears to be stable.
There have been no franchise moves since 1972. The threat re-
mains that despite Commissioner Ueberroth's opposition, those
teams that are suffering financially may be targets for cities with-
out teams. Any move may render baseball's antitrust exemption
subject to attack in the courts and/or Congress. Although the
courts have upheld baseball's exemption in the past, they recognize
that this exemption is inconsistent with the application of federal
antitrust laws to other sports, and the next court challenge may
result in a decision to treat baseball like all other sports.20 ' At the
very least, a court challenge would likely result in a call to Con-
204. Note, supra note 9, at 430.
205. Id. at 429; L. SOBEL, supra note 1, at 491; Glick, supra note 15, at 89.
206. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972). Note that three justices dissented
from the court's opinion in Flood, indicating that the issue of baseball's continued right to
an antitrust exemption is not clear cut. Changes in the court's composition could lead to a
change in the outcome of an antitrust challenge.
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gress to remedy this inconsistency.207 In fact, Congress may not
even wait for such a call, for the public outcry over a move may
spur it to action.20 8
Major league baseball can preempt any court or congressional
action and preserve its antitrust exemption by rectifying the weak-
nesses in its procedures for acting on franchise relocation requests.
Refinement of this process so that it is objective, clearly procompe-
titive and considers all interested parties will allow baseball to
avert any threat to its antitrust exemption and thus retain the
power to govern itself, determine its structure, and decide on the
number, identity and location of its members.2 0
Recognizing the interdependence of a league's members-the
need to ensure and preserve financial stability of teams and the
general importance of territorial exclusivity to this end-and the
consequent need for inquiry when an owner wishes to move, the
first part of any changes to the process should be the development
of procedures and criteria to guide the inquiry so that a move can
be evaluated reasonably.210
When a team requests a change in its location, the league
should conduct hearings in which interested parties are afforded
the opportunity to present oral or written testimony. In making its
decision on the request, the league should consider:
1) Qualifications of proposed recipient city
a. Size of market
1. population
2. growth rate
3. affluence of citizens (income statistics)
4. baseball tradition (number of successful minor league and/
207. Courts have already urged Congress to act: in Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves
Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court urged Congress to pass a law which would protect communities like Milwau-
kee from arbitrary and unfair dealing, and Chief Justice Burger urged Congress to act to
remedy this inconsistency. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 286 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
208. Baseball must remember that the Raiders move and most other franchise moves
have spurred congressional interest in regulating franchise moves, see supra note 193 and
accompanying text, and some members of Congress already believe cities and owners should
have protection against activities of major league baseball. See Hearings, supra note 7, at 3-
4 (statement of Senator Slade Gorton).
209. The refinement of the system also makes business sense: it may prevent unsuc-
cessful moves from occurring. See Quirk, supra note 6, at 59-60 (only five of the 10 franchise
moves have been successful).
210. Various other plans have been suggested to guide the league's inquiry so that a
move may be reasonably evaluated. See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 13,
at 148-55 (Supp. 1985); Wong, supra note 194, at 15-16; Kurlantzick, supra note 15, at 206-
07; Glick, supra note 15, at 91-9.
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or college teams, TV ratings)
5. available competing leisure time activities, including college
teams
6. current teams in same market area
7. television and radio market (projected local revenues)
b. Facilities
1. existing or being developed
2. lease arrangement
3. capacity (compare with attendance required for profitabil-
ity and stadia in comparably-sized areas)
4. physical condition
5. accessibility (transportation network)
6. adequacy of support services
c. Scheduling
1. regional balance
2. divisional alignments
3. travel costs
4. effect on traditional rivalries
2) Characteristics of original host city
a. Size of market
1. same as for proposed recipient city
2. effect on marketability of national TV broadcasts (is area a
major city essential to national credibility as an accepted
entertainment product)
b. Available facilities
1. same as for proposed recipient city
2. desire and ability of local officials to correct any
inadequacies
3. extent to which team has received public financial support
by means of publicly financed stadium and/or special tax
treatment
c. Scheduling
1. same as proposed recipient city
d. Local fan support
1. attendance
2. ticket sales
e. Profit/Losses
1. short and long term (preceding three seasons and ten
seasons)
2. amount of operating revenue from sports operations (rela-
tion to average revenues of other teams)
f. Other factors
1. team won-lost record
2. bona fide offer to purchase club at fair market value and
such offer includes continued location in home territory
3. extent to which those involved have engaged in good faith
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negotiations concerning arrangements under which the
team could stay in its current location
4. effect of change on any contract regarding current location
which club has entered
5. extent to which management contributed to circumstances
which demonstrate need for move
6. other factors as league deems appropriate
After evaluating these factors, the conclusion should be based on
whether the move is "necessary and appropriate." There should be
a presumption weighing against the move and in favor of stability
and fan loyalty.
A team should be required to stay in one city for a minimum
number of years in order to give that area a legitimate chance to
demonstrate its financial support of the team. Clubs should be per-
mitted to move before the end of the minimum time only if they
can demonstrate special circumstances such as extremely poor at-
tendance, inadequate facilities, or breach of lease. Such a mini-
mum period enhances establishment of fan support, protects the
league's goodwill, and protects local government's investments.
Baseball should also remove the veto power held by an owner
if a team wants to move into his territory. By allowing such veto
power, baseball places the determinative power in the hands of the
entity most interested in restricting competition. The owner pro-
tecting his territory may use this rule to extract indemnity pay-
ments from owners proposing moves into his area.21 1
Courts have determined that major league baseball is unlike
any other sport or entertainment business by virtue of its antitrust
exemption. Baseball must demonstrate that this trust in its ability
to control itself is well-deserved by taking steps on its own to pro-
tect its fans and ensure its stability.
211. Kurlantzick, supra note 15, at 202-03. In 1976, the New York Knicks of the Na-
tional Basketball Association permitted the New York Nets to move into Nassau County,
New York. The Knicks allowed this move into their home territory after agreeing to an
indemnity payment of $4 million. Goldpaper, supra note 110.
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